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9. The Contextual Balance of Social 
Capital within Hierarchical Relations ii: 
China: Benefits and Risks 
Karen Wang 
INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, the unique role of social capital in economic activities ID: 
been increasingly recognized. It is believed that social capital influencf 
career success (Gabbay and Zuckerman 1998) and fucilitates greater levels < 
production and enhances team effectiveness (Tsai and Ghoshal 1998). It 
also positively associated with a firm's performance (Peng and Luo 2001 
Brass et al. 2004) by enhancing innovation while reducing transaction cos 
for inter-firm collaboration (Robins and Atuahene.Gima 2003). Howeve 
previous research gives only limited attention to the role of hierarchic 
relations in buttressing social capital for business efficiency and focus1 
either on the relationships between individuals or units within organizatioJ 
or on partner relationships at the inter-finn level (Uzzi 1997). Therefor 
despite being acknowledged as an important component in social capital, tl 
issue of hierarchical relations and their impact on the development of soci 
capital remains under-explored (Adler and Kwon 2002). Furthermore, it 
widely accepted that social capital may produce social ills external to tl 
organization (Astone et al. 1999, Warren 2001). While the majority 
research using the concept of social capital focuses on the positi· 
consequences -of an adequate amount of social capital, little empiric 
research has been done 01i how the development of social capital may lead 
social risk in a society and to actors themselves. To fill this void this chap1 
addresses issues of the benefits and risks of social capital that Chinese fin 
may encounter when networking in a hierarchical social structure. 
The hierarchical structure of social capital has been applied to a wi 
range of social phenomena, including relations inside and outside the fam 
(Coleman 1988), relations within and beyond the finn (Burt 1992), 1 
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finn/government interface (Baker 1990) and public life in contemporary 
societies (Putnam 1993 1995). This study examines hierarchical relations 
related to social capital at the level of firm/government interfaces and looks 
at how a fum engages in external relations with people who have 'monopoly 
power in business within a government system' (referred to as "MPBGS). 
Specifically,,the focus is on the hierarchical relations embedded in social 
capital, characterized by one side having less dependence and the other side 
having more dependence. 'Hierarchy is an important dimension of social 
structure that indirectly influences social capital by shaping the structure of 
social relations' (Adler and Kwon 2002, p. 27). The issue of hierarchically 
related social capital is especially important for business success within the 
context of countries that have limited implementation of legal restrictions and 
whose economy is heavily based on a hierarchical system of bureaucracy. 
Examples of these countries include China, India, Russia, Indonesia and 
Mexico (Raiser 1997, Michailova and Worm 2003), whose organizations 
tend to be characterized by highly formal authority relations and high power-
distance. 
Finns in China use networking as an e:Bective business strategy within the 
current economic and governmental systems. Of the various types of 
network, developing the social ties embedded in the formal hierarchical 
system is an important strategic focus for many firms. This is especially the 
case when fums face an environment in which the Chinese gove=ent still 
exerts a strong influence on economic decision making (Peng and Luo 2000). 
The role of government raises several research questions: namely, what 
benefits does a firm expect to obtain through the embeddedness of social 
capital in people with M:PBGS? What risks does a fum expect to face when 
involved in such relations? It would, therefore, be worth investigating how 
highly differentiated status relations, together with consequent unequal power 
in the social structure, influence the benefits and risks of social capital that 
fums pursue within the context of China's transition economy. 
The study covered in this chapter investigates the extent to which this kind 
of social capital can bring value to the fum in relation to exclusive 
information and resources. The linkage of these exchanges with the risks of 
corruption, and the potential cost, is also included in the investigation. The 
results of this study increase our understanding of the role of power 
inequality in the development of social capital. More importantly, it increases 
our knowledge of such features within the context of China's economy. 
SOCIAL CAPITAL AND HIERARCHICAL RELATIONS 
Social capital is a productive resource, facilitating actions in a firm's business 
operations (for example, Baker 1990, Coleman 1990, Burt 1992, Tsai and 
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Ghoshall998). Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1997) argue that it makes possi~le the 
achievement of certain ends that in its absence would not be p~sstble _or 
would at least come at higher cost. From a resource-related perspectLve social 
capital is 'the aggregate of the actual and potential resources that are l~ed to 
the possession of a durable network of relationship or mutual acquamtance 
and recognition' (Bourdieu 1986, p. 248). 
Social capital has also been understood by Fukuyama (1995) as a 
capability that is based on trust (cf. Putnam 1993, p. 167). Social capital~ 
trust is the capacity of people to work together for conunon purposes tn 
groups and organizations (Fukuyama 1995). Social organization ~at can 
marshal trust, nonns and networks can improve the efficiency of soctety ?Y 
more easily facilitating coordinated actions {Putnam 1993, p. 167). Social 
capital looked at from the perspective of its functional role, is defined as the 
value ~ actors of those aspects or resources of the social structure that can be 
used to realize their interests (Coleman 1990, pp. 302-7). In this study 
Coleman's defmition of social capital is adopted to explain the effects of 
hierarchical relations on a finn's business. Coleman's definition of social 
capital is chosen because its emphasis on th~ functi~ of ~e soc~al st:mcture 
reflects the essential features of social capttal, which differentiate tt from 
other fonns of capital, such as, human and financial capital. . 
Social capital is the sum of the actual and potential ~alue. embedded tn 
social structures, which can be activated through the actors soctal exchan~es. 
Although actors are central to social exchange_s by virtue _of the spec~c 
interest they have in realizing outcomes, the soctal structure ts als~ essential 
in developing and sustaining social capital. The r_eason ~t socrnl cap1tal 
offers a return is that the social relations embedded tn the socml structure can 
provide the antecedents of cooperation, through which actors' resources are 
complemented, combined and multiplied to mutual benefit (~arren 2001). 
Although some exchanges bring about an individual equilibrium based on 
equal interest and mutual exchanges of resources,_ many other exc~ges _are 
based on hierarchical relations (Warren 2001). Wtth respect to soctal capttal, 
hierarchical relations refer to a structural relationship between two sides with 
variously exchangeable value and where levels of social status are 
differentiated and unequal. Some of these are a type of relations that 'lie 
between constrained positions' as structural holes, characterized by the 
absence of a direct link between some actors in the total network. One side of 
the hierarchical relation has a chance to play the role of brokering 
transactions between dyadic actors, who are otherwise disconnected (Brass et 
al.l998). Brasset al. (1998) argue that such weak. ties are likely to bring extra 
opportunities for the unconnected dyads, compared with a closure of strong 
ties, which process similar resources and knowledge. . . 
Social exchanges that are enacted through social capital occur wtthin 
structures of mutual dependence in which actors rely on each other for valued 
L 212 Chinese business relations outcomes (Molm et a!. 2000). Paired exchanges of social capital do not take 
place in a vacuum. They develop within a societal context in which there is 
competition for till: resources held by each actor (Coleman 1990, Putnam 
1993). Fukuyama (1995). The actors' exchange of power within the 
structures depends on the perceived value of resources in their interactive 
relationships (Molm et a!. 2000). The value of social capital within a context 
depends on both of the actors' interest in events. In such a situation, if an 
actor's power is premised on being able to exercise some degree of control 
over events which are valuable for others in a social network they will create 
an imbalanced power relation, a hierarchical relation which will shape the 
natme of social interactions. The chapter empirically tests these links, 
something not done in previous research, and examines the development of 
social capital within power imbalanced relations with regard to the 
opportunities for benevolent or exploitative behaviour. 
Acce.ss to Exclusive Information and Resources 
Research suggests that social networks generally facilitate the rapid 
dissemination of information among members and reduce asymmetries in its 
distribution that can otherwise discourage profitable transactions (Nahapiet 
and Ghoshal 1997, Uzzi 1999). There are three types of social capital situated 
externally to an enterprise through production-related, environment-related 
and market-related networks (Uzzi 1997, Westlund 2003). A firm may 
facilitate business transactions through social networks at the peer-relation 
level. A finn makes reciprocal exchanges either in production-related social 
capital, which is about inter-ftrm relations, such as relations with suppliers, or 
in market-related social capital, which is about networking with customers or 
buyers. 
A firm must also develop environment-related social capital, which 
involves it embedding its relations with communities, local government and 
other business enterprises (Westlund 2003). To keep ahead of competition, a 
fum needs to give an expression of dependence on a predictable institutional 
infrastructure to facilitate favourable decisions or business policies in a 
medium-term and short-term perspective (Westlund 2003). A fum develops 
social capital of hierarchical relations with individuals in the government to 
downgrade the firm's economic inefficiency by obtaining non-official 
infonnation (Westlund 2003). Information and resource exchange for 
business purposes becomes unilaterally important to a firm, while people 
with higher formal status on the other side monopolize information and 
exclusively control the distribution of resources. 
Social capital is believed to lead to distributive efficiency of resources at 
the peer level that usually results from market-related and production-related 
connections (Uzzi 1997). Instead of relative distributive efficiency, based on 
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free-market operations, social capital in hierarchical relations provides 
distributive solutions through control of environment-related connections. 
People with MPBGS are in a position to access exclusive information and 
resources unilaterally needed by the firm, which enables such people to bring 
a perceived high value of social capital into exchange relations with the firm, 
because resources of money, power, prestige and the like are mostly 
'structurally embedded' within hierarchies (Warren 2001). Structural holes 
created by these hierarchical relations present opportunities for brokering 
information and resources among firms, brokerage opportunities that have the 
potential for significant economic payoffs (Walker eta!. 1997, Brasset aL 
2004). Although people with MPBGS may not hold resources directly, they 
are able to play the role of a broker to coordinate infuct connections 
between 'donors' and 'receivers'. According to structural hole theory, people 
in such brokering positions in a network present opportunities and potential 
resource flows for nnconnected actors to access, which can have great 
economic payoffs (Burt 1992). 
Such an effect of the social capital in hierarchical relations is evident 
within the context of China's transitional economy. In a weak institutional 
environment with poorly functioning societal regulations and legal 
mechanisms, environment-related social capital can be seen as an efficient 
way of providing responses to the competition. People with MPBGS can 
disseminate exclusive information and reallocate resources in a manipulative 
manner by taking advantage of their position. These people are able to 
provide information and opportunities directly or link otherwise disconnected 
firms. They are not part of the fum's routine closure uetworks of production 
and marketing; rather they are randomly chosen by the fum on the basis of 
their usefulness and are expected to play a role of structural hole in the firm's 
social networks. Structural holes are richly embedded in the environment-
related social capital of China's cross~functiooal economic and political 
systems. To the Chinese firm, when hierarchical relations are closely 
embedded with relations with government officials, then access can be gained 
to a range of resources that are usually difficult to access without competing 
with other firms. Such resources include the difficult issue of land use, 
permission to import or export certain goods, and projects that are associated 
with significant financial resources and other production-related resources. 
Social networking with people with MPBGS is significant in relation tc 
exclusive information in China. As highlighted above, the market economy ir 
China remains immature. Both local and central governments are constant!) 
introducing a wide range of contingencies and amending policies in order tc 
control the economy. Using embeddedness in the hierarchical structure, th~ 
Chinese firm has a chance to facilitate governmental decisions in favour ol 
their own business at the local leveL They also have an opportunity to acces! 
exclusive information, such as new policies and regulations influencin~ 
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industries and the market, before such arrangements are announced publicly. 
Consequently they are able to prepare themselves better in the competitive 
market. 
Burt (1992) argues that the higher the proportion of relationships 
enhanced by structural holes, the more likely and able the entrepreneurial 
players are to develop a higher aggregate rate of return on investments in 
networks. Whether a firm can gain the required and exclusive information 
and resources is likely to depend on the result of their social networking with 
people who possess MPBGS. This leads to the following: 
Hypothesis 1: Social capital based on hierarchical relations is positively 
associated with a fum's access to exclusive business information in China. 
Hypothesis 2: Social capital based on hierarchical relations is positively 
associated with a firm's access to exclusive business resources in China. 
Structural holes embedded in imbalance of power relations not only create 
extra opportunities for access to recourses but also more chances for 
unethical. behaviour (Bass et a!. 1998). On the one hand, a person with 
MPBGS 1S able to help the networked finn with exclusive information and 
access to resources. Their support can be crucial for the firm in enhancing the 
efficiency and effectiveness of business operations in a highly competitive 
market. Hence, on the other hand, the use of this hierarchical social capital 
exposes firms to risks of bribery/corruption interactions and high costs in the 
pursuit of what appears to be a rational self-interest in an immature system 
(Warren 2001). 
Risk of Corruption and High Cost in Social Capital of 
Hierarchical Relations 
The imbalance of power in hierarchical relations exerts a detennining role in 
the cost/benefits balance in social capital. It shapes the nature of reciprocal 
exchanges, the level of trust and commitment present, and the expectation of 
continued interaction (Molm et al. 2000, Warren 2001). According to 
resource-dependency theory, inequalities in power and dependence create 
unbalanced power relations, in which the least dependent actor has a power 
advantage over the others. Lower dependence in a power relation tends to 
produce a corresponding inequality in exchange benefits between partners to 
the relati~n (Pfeffer and Salancik 2003). Unethical behaviour is more likely 
to occur m structural holes where there are asynnnetric relationships (Burt 
1992, Brass et al. 1998, Warren 2001), since there is a chance for the less 
dependent actor to request unreasonable reciprocity by trading exclusive 
resources, information or opportunities. Embedding the relationships with 
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MPBGS may not only generate value for the business but also expose the 
fiiill to exploitation, bribery/corruption interaction and low levels of trust 
(Brasset al. 1998). 
Arguably, under conditions where the government's internal structure and 
processes display sufficient integrity and its external relations with actors in 
civil society display sufficient synergy, a government's hierarchical relations 
can support the positive effects of civil society's social capital (Evans 1996). 
However, in reality such conditions do not readily exist in a transition 
economy where the legal system is immature or implementation processes 
are weak (Adler and Kwon 2002). Some social risks may emerge as a result 
of insufficient integrity within the governmental hierarchical structure. It has 
been suggested that the development of social capital contains the possibility 
of creating both positive and negative effects in terms of social relations 
within societies (Uzzi 1997). Hence, a salient issue is what kinds of negative 
social outcomes related to social capital occur in societies and firms when 
transition economies limit the maturity and transparency of key social 
institutions. 
Hierarchical relations within organizations, where obedience to authority 
is exchanged for material and job security, have negative effects on employee 
commitment (Brasset al. 1998, Adler and Kwon 2002). At the inter-firm or 
finn-government !eve~ social exchanges with hierarchically based structural 
holes are also likely to have negative effects on both individuals and 
members of the wider society (Pildes 1996, Hyden 1997, Adler anrl Kwon 
2002). In line with democratic theory, there should be a close connection 
between unequally distributed background empowerment and the negative 
functioning of social capital ['N arren 2001 ). 
Warren (2001) argues that corruption is an indirect result of elevated 
levels of bureaucracy combined with weak democratic processes. In a poorly 
functioning democracy, where business activities may not be conducted 
creditably and the empowering institutions and legal mechanis!Il5 remain 
weak, the functions of social capital are likely to be associated with negative 
externalities. First, these conditions provide opportunity for some in formal 
hierarchical positions to acquire excessive positional power from controlling 
economic activities. 'Excessive bureaucratic roles and ''red tape" can limit 
access to government powers and resources', and can be used by officials as 
power. This is especially the case where officials have 'discretion in 
interpreting and applying regulations' (Warren 2001). Due to monopoly 
power in certain economic activities, resource allocation and economic 
policies are not always transparent, inevitably creating a climate of economic 
dependence where firms depend on governmental officials. 
From a resource-dependence perspective (Emerson 1962, Pfeffer and 
Leong 1977), power results from both access to and control over important 
business resources. People who control relevant resources increase others' 
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dependence on them, thereby acquiring power (Pfeffer 1981, Brass et al. 
1998, Pfeffer and Salancik 2003). According to social netWork theory, they 
are in a position to decide whether to bring high value to a firm or to what 
extent a fum should bear high risk {Brass eta!. 1998). Power imbalance in 
social exchange carries the potential for corrupt interaction and a high cost 
for dependent parties. 
The exclusive benefits provided through the social capital of hierarchical 
relations encourage the firm to develop such social capital at all costs. These 
costs might include engaging in corrupt interactions or attempting to 
eliminate other competitors. By using embeddedness, the finn can more 
readily deal with the people holding monopoly power in order to gain 
exclusive infonnation and resources. At the same time they can also 
effectively constrain access for other firms to similar resources and business 
opportunities, resulting in benefits for themselves as 'insiders' and placing 
the other finn as the 'outsider' in a network, which limits fair and equitable 
competition (Warren 2001, Coleman 1990). The immature legal system 
offers little check on illegal or unethical conduct. The structural holes created 
by the hierarchy deepen the opportunities afforded by the unchecked 
situation. Consequently, social capital functions in a climate that cultivates 
the bribery/corruption interaction, as people with MPBGS can readily act 
against regulations to fulfil their own self-interest. 
Currently, the economy in China is developing without a parallel process 
of political openness, allowing the government to maiiltain a strong influence 
over the operations of the market. Some officials can gain access to new 
economic resources by trading their power (Warren 2001). There is a many-
layered bureaucracy, which functions to control the economy, implement 
policy and regulations and direct resource allocation in relation to business 
activity. The system creates no equality in social exchanges either for or with 
business fU'lllS. Unequally distributed power in controlling markets results in 
many Chinese businesses depending heavily on people with MPBGS. Thus, it 
is in the interest of the finn to establish social relations with such people. The 
bribery/corruption interaction may be perceived as an unavoidable means of 
entry into the network of hierarchical relations or as part of the social capital 
strategies used by Chinese firms. 
The legal system in China is relatively weak. While there are many 
regulations, their enforcement is indifferent. Put simply, some people in the 
system have no intention of seriously implementing these regulations. They 
take advantage of their powerful position and use personal discretion in the 
implementation process to pursue their own self-interest. In addition, the 
traditional Chinese culture of Confucianism, which encourages people to 
accept unequal status within political, social and economic relations, has a 
strong imprint on the social ideology of modem China. Awareness of the 
civic right of equality in China is limited; consequently, inappropriate 
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interactions occurring at some hierarchical levels are not easi~y detec.ted and 
monitored (Brasset al. 1998). With all these factors, corrupt mten:ct10ns .are 
likely to increase when a finn cultivates social capital at upper hierarchical 
levels. _._ ·a 
T 0 secure resourceful hierarchical relations, the finn as the depen=ut Sl e 
may have to pay a hefty cost (Bae and Gargiulo ~004): The cost ~ I~ly to 
increase when partners are in a position to impose mordinate cootributtons on 
the finn or to appropriate a disproportionate fraction of the value created by 
the relationship. The benefits that accrue to a finn as a result of ~n allia~e 
with a resource-rich partner might be offset by the costs assoc1.ated With 
maintaining them (Warren 2001, Bae and Gargiulo 2004). The Chinese fum 
is likely to become the vulnerable partner and bear the bulk of the costs for 
the social capital ofhierarchical relations. 
Hypothesis 3: The bnbery-corruption interaction is positively associated 
with the social capital of hierarchical relatiol18 in China. 
Hypothesis 4: The cost to the finn of cultiva~g soc~al relati.ons !s 
positively associated with social capital based on hierarchical relations m 
China. 
Tbe Moderating Effect of Self-interest 
Social capital is the combined effect of the purposes involved in social 
relations, the structural position in hierarchies that provide resources for 
actors, and networks that provide access to positions and integrate purpoS:S 
and resources so that they function as social capital (Warren 2001). Soc1al 
capital is not a neutral concept with regard to society_'s interests. It exp~sses 
and achieves the interests and purposes of actors, which may be beneficial or 
detrimental for society (Westlund 2003). Such outcomes are likely to depend 
not only on the contextual conditions of positional power in the hierarchical 
structure but also on the motivation of individuals. 'Hierarchy can also 
influence motivation - through the effect it has on incentives, norms and 
abilities- through its effect on authority, resources, skills, and beliefs' (Adler 
and Kwon 2002, p. 27). Many ties come with formal positions and are not 
chosen voluntarily (Podolny and Baron 1997). People who are able to~ 
state monopoly powers to impose 'rents' on firms that need their informatton 
and allocation of resources may seek individual interests (Warren 2001). 
Social capital can therefore be simultaneously a 'private good' and a 'public 
good' (Warren 2001). . 
Taken as a private good, social capital may be turned from a soc~ good 
to a social ill by individuals with self-seeking motivatio.n. Accor~g to 
agency theory, the purpose ofany individual's exchange wtth others will be 
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to gain_ maxim~ pers?nal outcomes. Therefore, there is a possibility of 
gene_rat.~g negatt:e soctetal effects if actors maintain their social capital for 
maxtmiZmg self-mterest, especially if the social exchange is attached to an 
imbalance of power. The power inherent in hierarchies encompassing 
authority, resources, infonnation and opportunities may engender a desire to 
maximize an individual's outcome from a social exchange. 
A position of MPBGS engenders the holders with strong power in social 
exchanges over the finn and facilitates both the firm's business and personal 
interests: Power _of exc~ge value can be used as the means of coordinating 
~xpec~tion and_ mteracllon between social actors (Bachmann 2003). If people 
~ a higher ~osttlon of ?o.wer in an exchange structure strongly pursue self-
mterest and Ignore public mterest, then corruption will have a chance to occur 
during the development of social capital. The positive relationship between 
bribery/corruption interaction and the sociaJ capital of hierarchical relations is 
likely to be stronger when the individual interest of people with MPBGS in 
the interactive relations is higher. 
~ypo~sis 5: ~elf-interested motivation of people with monopoly power 
m busmess Will moderate the relationship between social capital and 
bribery/corruption interaction. 
Method 
Sampling and procedure 
The aim of this study was to understand the behaviour of individuals 
concerning social capital at the finn level. A convenient sample was drawn 
from Executive MBA courses where most participants were CEOs and top-
level managers. Their demographic infonnation is reported in Table 9.1. The 
surve?'. was conducted in 2004 across different locations in China, including 
the cttles of Shanghai, Beijing, Changsha and Nanning. Participants were 
given questionnaires on the first day of class and asked to return them on the 
last day of the course. Of the 75 individuals who actually received 
questionnaires, 19 individuals did not return them, yielding a sample for this 
study of 56 top management people (46 males and 10 females). Respondents 
represented 56 finns from a variety of industries. 
Measures 
The survey instrument 'Was developed from a literature review and from 
preliminary pilot interviews. First, based on conceptual discussion in the 
~itera~,. a questionnaire was designed and developed. Second, a pilot 
mvestlgatton was conducted with a questionnaire survey. This was followed 
by interviews with participants to obtain feedback on the instrument. The 
questionnaire was then modified according to this feedback. Finally, the 
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revised questionnaire was distributed at appropriate opportunities during 
2004. The subjects were asked to express their level of agreement with a 
given statement via a five-point Likert Scale- ranging from 'Strongly Agree' 
to 'Strongly Disagree'. 
Dependent variables 
The variables of access to information and access to resources tested the 
extent to which a firm obtains exclusive information and resources through 
networking and establishing relationships with people holding a formal 
position of privilege in dealing with business. The scale of access to 
infonnation was composed of two items measuring the variable for obtaining 
exclusive business infonnation: fur example, 'the finn can obtain exclusive 
information from the people holding a formal position which has privileged 
powers in dealing with businesses'. The variable of access to exclusive 
resources was tested by a scale with two items, which were that 'those people 
provide my finn with financial resources' and that 'relationships with them 
assist in attracting other critical resources'. 
Table 9.1 Demographic characteristics of top managers in China 
Variable 
Gender Male Fenwle 
(n. and %) 46(82.1) 10 {17.9) 
Ag' 25-35 36-45 46-55 
12 (21.4) 30 (53.6) 14 (25) 
Education El~ Hgh sch College Post grad 
0 0 54 (96%) 2 (4%) 
Work yrs in co. <2 2-5 6-10 I J-19 20<-
8 (14.3) 14 (25) 6 (10.7) 20 (35.7) 8 (14.3) 
Mgt position CEO Topmgr Snr mgr Middle mgr 
20 (35.7) 24{42.9) 12 (21.4) 0 
Independent variables 
The social capital of hierarchical relations measure tested the extent to which 
the firm's networks of hierarchical relations are possessed for their business. 
The construct was composed of three items to test this variable: for example, 
'my firm has close relationships with people who hold a formal position with 
privileged powers in dealing with business'; 'my firm always networks with 
people who have a formal position that allows them to influence decisions 
about what assistance is given to business finns'. The social capital of 
hierarchical relations is also tested as the dependent variable in Hypotheses 3, 
4 and 5. 
I 
I. 
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e T? m~asure corruption the extent to which bribery/corruption interactions 
ar ~vo ved when the fmn develops social networks with . . :~:;~ w~-~ te_sted_. ~ee items fanned the scale testing this v=~~~~:~ 
. , L _Is . mevitable that the fmn has to be involved. in 
:~:;~/c;:p~7dmteraction if it wants :~ develop a close relationship with 
businesses'. a government position with privileged powers in 
A scale for measuring high firm ts to which a firm has to hi h cos . ~s developed to gauge the extent 
pay g costs to rmnate and cultivate relatio 1...;.... f 
unequal power when placed in d den ns'""t's o 
Three items f~ed the sc-'o • .',tm~g"th epe~ bit position in the dyadic tie. 
'" ""' e vana e· for exa 1 ,. · 
costly for the firm to establish co . . · . mp e, It IS very 
holder(s)'. nnectmns WLth a busmess monopoly power 
A measure of self~interest pursuit, co ns· thr . 
extent to which the motivation oftho•o ?'Pth himg ee Items, examined the 
· · . W1 gher status in mo- 1 
Is percewed as self-mterest One of the . 0 Y power 
following statement: 'the ~ason that thoquestLons as~d f~r ~ reaction to the 
dealing with b · lik se people WLth pr!Vlleged powers in 
personal return ~mess e to help the fum is that they want to for their 
Control variables 
Since the c_ost and benefits of social capital are aggregated by th firm, 
control variables at the fum level are included in the analysis. The~ . tw_o 
a measure of the number of 1 . mn siZe IS suggests tha , . . emp oyees m the fum as previous research 
survival a~ ~r~e~~lZ~Is Cn;::ti~~y related to the need for social ties for 
2000).Thesmallerthefumis th e~= T~g 1996, Peng and Luo 
business security and ' The more will rely on social capital for 
fi , . success. e firm's years measures the 1 ngth f 
um s eXIstence since it was established. The length of w . e o the co~any was also controlled for in the hierarchi ork ~ the curr~t 
Soc1al relations and their ben fit 1 cal regressiOn analys
1s. 
strategies. It often takes time for ~es fi a v.;ays reflect the finn's long-term 
social capital on the business which ~~ manageme~t. to see the effects of 
periods in the same comp ' up as parnctpants work for long 
my. 
Validity 
F~~, the. questionnaire was translated from English into Man . 
ongmal 1terns were all derived from the English b d 1. darin, as the 
versions in Mandarin and English were made e . - ~e lt~rature. ~ 
the questions through backwards-fa qwv~t m meanmg, refmmg 
were guaranteed anon . a rwar~ ~lati_on. Second, respondents 
for common method v~ty nd_ confidentJ.altty. Third, all items were tested 
anance usmg the approach of Harman's one-factor test 
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(Podsakoff et a!. 2003), even though the research reported is not typical 
behavioural research. All the variables used in the current study were entered 
into an unrotated factor analysis, in tenns of theii fictional categories, to 
detenni.ne the number of factors. No single factor emerged from the factor 
analysis. This indicates that the data did not suffer the problem of common 
method variance. 
The social capital item consisted of three items, on the basis of a factor 
loading of 0.40 as the criterion for inclusion. With the same procedure and 
criterion, the factor analysis showed that the items resulted in two factors 
from access to exclusive information, two from access to resources, three 
from corruption, three from high cost (with one reversed item) and three from 
pursuing self-interest (with 2 reversed items). Only one item was abandoned 
from items forming the scales because of its low factor loading. Finally, the 
chosen items yielded a reliable Cronbach's alpha. 
Analysis and Reliability 
Using scales based on 56 participants, the analysis involved regression on 
dimensions with variables of strategy of social capital (Cronbach's alpha "" 
0.70), access to exclusive information (Cronbacb's alpha= 0.89), access to 
resources (Cronbach's alpha = 0.84), risk of bnbery/corruption interaction 
(Cronbach's alpha= 0.86), risk of high finn cost {Cronbach's alpha= 0.81) 
and self-interested pursuit of hierarchical relations (Cronbach's alpha"" 0.86). 
Prior to the statistical analysis, the codes of the responses to a rrumber of 
items were reversed, so that all of the items that were measured with a higher 
score represented a higher level of preference on the scale. In the first 
hierarchical regression analysis, testing the relationship between access 
variables and social capital, access to information and resources was 
regressed on variables measuring the de1110graphic factors of CEOs and 
senior managers, the fmn size and length o~ establishment (Step l); then by 
social capital (Step 2). In the second hierarchical regression analysis testing 
the relationship between social capital and social risk variables, social capital 
was regressed on variables of the demographic factnrs of the participants, the 
firm size and length of establishment (Step 1); corruption, the fum cost and 
self-interest pursuit (Step 2); and the interaction of bnbery/corruption 
interaction with self~interested pursuit (Step 3). 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The means, standard deviations and Pearson correlations for demographic 
variables, the dependent variable of social capital and the independent 
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variables, including benefits in information and resources, risks of corruption, 
the high cost to the finn and self-interested pursuit, are set out in Table 9.2. 
The results of correlations indicate that there are positive relations between 
the social capital and access to exclusive information (r = 0.62, p < 0.01) and 
resources (r = 0.63; p < 0.01). 
There is a negative relation between the social capital and the fmn cost 
(r = -0.49, p< 0.05). There is a positive relationship between risk of 
bribery/corruption interaction and risk of self-interest. There is also a positive 
relation between social capital and the length of work experience in current 
companies. 
Table 9.2 Means, standard deviations and Pearson correlations" 
for variables 
VR M so 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
WY 4.00 1.62 
FY 21.12 0.18 0.60** 
FZ" 5.12 Ll7 O.o? 0.33 
sc 4.21 0.58 0.53*** 0.26 -0.13 
BR 3.68 0.10 0.41 * -{).09 0.25 0.62** 
Bl 4.35 0.70 0.38 0.38 0.25 0.63** 0.65* .. 
RHC 3.22 1.03 -0.09 -0.11 -0.11 -0.49* -0.04 0.10 
RSI 2.92 1.08 -O.Ql 0.03 -0.03 0.12 0.\7 0.38 0.40 
9 
RBC 3.08 1.01-0.19 0.03 0.35 -0.02 0.08 0.35 0.34 0.39 0.57* 
Notes: "• p<.05; •• p<.Ol; ***p<.OOI; (2-tailed); VR variables, WY~ork years in 
company and was coded as; !""less than 2 years; 2=215 years; 3=6/10 years; 4-'11120 
years and 5=over 20 years; FY=firm's years; FZC=flrm size and was coded as 1= 1-10; 
2=ll-30; 4=31-100; 4=101-200; 5=over 200; 6=over 1000; SO=social capital; 
BR""'benefit in resources; BI=benefit in information; RHC=risk in high cost; RI-risk 
in self-interest and RBC=risk in bribery/corruption interaction. 
The results of hierarchical regressions, set out in Table 9.3, indicate that 
the benefits of exclusive information (p<0.05) and resources (p<O.Ol) have 
positive direct effects on the firm's social capital in hierarchical relations. 
Hence, Hypothesis 1 that social capital in hierarchical relations is positively 
associated with the firm's access to exclusive, important business information 
in China, and Hypothesis 2 that social capital in hierarchical relations is 
positively associated with the firm's access to business resources in China, 
are both supported. 
The results of hierarchical regression that are reported in Table 9.4 
demonstrate the effects of the risk factors for the social capital. There is a 
positive linkage between the bribery/corruption interaction and social capital 
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embedded in hierarchical relations. Hypothesis 3, which assume~ that ~e 
bribery/corruption interaction is positively associated with the soctal ca~ttal 
of hierarchical relations in China, is also supported However, th~ IS. a 
negative relationship betWeen the high firm cost and social cap~tal. m 
hierarchical relations. Hypothesis 4, which states that th~ cost ~f cultiva~g 
social relations for the firm is positively associated wtth socml_ capttal_ m 
hierarchical relations in China, is rejected. No coefficient fo: the mterac~on 
of self-interested pursuit with the relationship of bnbery/corrupllon 
interaction and social capital is significant. Hypothesis 5, which_ states_ that 
the self-interested motivation of people with monopoly power m busmess 
will moderate the relationship between social capital and corruption, 
therefore, is rejected. 
Table 9.3 Hierarchical regression analysis for access to information and 
resources and social capital in hierarchical relations in China 




Controls 0.19 Work yrs in co. O.D31 -o.\86 0.66t 
Finn years -0.35 -0.27 -o.26 -0.18 
Firm size 0.05 0.13 -17.00 -0.09 
Main effects 
Social capital of 
hier. relations 0.75* 0.72** 
R' 0.12 0.49 0.31 0.65 
AdjustR2 -0.18 0.29 0.08 0.50* 
F 0.39 3.11* 1.35 4.15" 
Observation (n.) 56 56 
Notes: Standardized coefficients are reported; t p<.\0; • p<.OS; •• p<.Ol; *** 
p<.OOl 
This research addresses the question of whether a firm's social capital 
embedded in hierarchical relations is related to benefits at the fum level as 
well as the involvement of negative externalities. The findings of ~s 
research contribute empirical evidence to support the proposition that there ts 
not only a connection between the benefits and soci~l c~pital in hierarchical 
relations but there is also a linkage between the soctal nsks for the finn and 
the sociai capital of hierarchical relations in the context of China. 
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Theoretical Implications 
~ antic!pated, the fmdings of this study indicate that access to exclusive 
~rmall~n _and_ reso~ces pro~des a reason for a finn to pursue social 
capttal Within hierarchic~! relations. This is consistent with Brass et al.'s 
(2004) argumen_t concenung power in social networks. The findings indicate 
that firms percelVe that the cost of dealing with poople with monop 1 
· thigh Thi · · o Y power 
lS no · s result 1s opposite to the original hypotho•'• It-· ·•-0 d ·th th · ..,, ...... y mean Wilt 
c mpare WI e return on mvestment from social networks of hierarchical 
Table 9.4 lf_ierarch.ical regression analysis for risks and social capital in 
hierarchical relations in China 
Variable Social capital 
Modell Model2 Model3 
Centrals 
Work yrs in co. 0.66t 0.23t 0.26 
The firm years -0.11 0.22t 0.21 







bribery! corruption 0.30* 0.30* 
self· interest 0.26* 0.\4 
Interactive effect 
Risk in bribery/corruption 
interaction x risk in self-interest 0.32 
R' 0.57 0.97 
Adjust R! 0.98 0.11 0.88 0.94 
F 1.49 15.92*** 26.69*** 
Observation number 56 56 56 
Notes: Standardized coefficients are reported; tp<.10; • p<.05; ** p<.OJ; u• p<.Oo 1. 
relations, the transaction cost becomes an investment with a high P' ff T 
the firm, · tin · th · Y·O . o 
. mves g m e socml capital of hierarchical relations is a 'low cost' 
m tenus of a guaranteed return, when compared with g·-"lin th 
P 
"bility f ,_., · <11lll} g on e 
osst o .u.uonnatwn and allocated resources obtained randoml thr h 
formal chann 1 .,...,_,. 1 · Y oug 
. . e s. um; resu t 1S also different from Warren's (ZOOl) 
proposttion that the more dependent side of a social relation bears a high co t 
: ~ pwpo.se _of social capital in the hierarchical relationships. Such sa 
ding may mdicate the nature of social capital in hierarchical relations 
' 
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similarly to other horizontal relations of social capital, is both productive and 
market·related (horizontal) - seeking a gain that is higher than the cost. In 
particular, a finn may not perceive the cost to be high when it uses the 
financial resources of the business to deal with individuals positioned in the 
hierarchical system 
The findings of the research also indicate that there is a positive 
relationship between involvement in bribery/corruption interaction and the 
social capital of hierarchical relations, which supports the hypothesis. It 
sustains the previous argument that reciprocity can cause obligations to 
accumulate in the hands of those who have more resources when there is the 
context of asynuuetric power relations (Warren 2001). The findings support 
the arguments of Brass et al. (1998) that negative externalities are likely to 
occur in sparsely connected and weak·tie networks. The social exchanges 
between the firm and individuals with power based on their fonnal position 
occur in sparsely connected networks. Both sides, but especially the higher 
status side, may act to begin, terminate or resume the mutual exchanges at 
any time. The finn's relative vulnerability leads to a lowered resistance to 
involvement in the bribery/corruption interactions with people in powerful 
positions of control, especially when the firm is keen to compete in the 
market. 
Practical Implications 
These findings clearly indicate that the social capital of hierarchical relations 
in China is currently highly related to the finn's business activities and plays 
a role in the facilitation of business gains. Social capital in hierarchical 
relations brings to the Chinese firm the advantages of access to exclusive 
infonnation and resources for business. In other words, Chinese firms may 
sometimes rely on capital of this type to obtain advantages in highly 
competitive situations. Such reliance may occur when running a business 
where the marketing economy remains incomplete and both the local and 
central governments have power to influence the allocation of business 
resources and stipulate various regulations. The Chinese firm develops 
structural holes of social capital with some individuals in the bureaucratic 
system, enabling them to channel resources into the firm. 
To develop such structural holes for business, Chinese firms must 
sometimes become involved in negative externalities of corrupt activities. 
The findings of this study indicate that the more social capital gained, the 
more bribery/corruption interactions the finn may have to be involved in with 
those in hierarchical relations. Wben two sides of a relation are equal they are 
usually interdependent; each contributes something important to the 
exchange. Hence they are bound to each other. However, the discrepancy in a 
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other, with the Chinese finn being more reliant on those with monopoly 
power. The empirical evidence of this study supports Warren's (2001) 
proposition that corrupt exchanges are based upon the allocation of 
information and resources that are without transparency. Bribery/corruption 
interaction may be inevitable if a market is unable to function independently 
as if it were comprised of relatively perfectly competitive firms following the 
laws of the free market, as is the case in the transition economy of China. 
Those in key positions in the circuits of power relations can manipulate the 
allocation of information and resources for their interests, the negative aspect 
of social capital (Clegg 1989, Coleman 1990). 
Limitation and Directions for Future Research 
As with much research, this study has limitations. In this light, further 
research is needed. While social capital in the context of hierarchical 
relations has been directly linked here with a firm's gain in information and 
resources, in practice the functioning of social capital to generate benefits or 
lead to risks is complex. How a firm prudently mitigates the risks to 
maximize benefits from social capital is likely to involve a complex social 
and psychological process. The results of this study reflect only some of the 
factors in these relationships. More elements need to be explored empirically 
in order to fully understand this complex envirorunent. 
This study examined the risks of a high cost and potential corruption in 
relation to social capital. Other negative effects such as the risk of low trust, 
no reciprocity or dysfunctional networks, however, are not included in this 
study. Nevertheless, it is important to know whether other negative 
externalities can occur in the functioning of social capital and this could be 
explored in a future study. Furthermore, a comparative study of hierarchical 
relations and other types of relations that configure social capital may provide 
a clearer picture of how such relations are related to the risks and benefits of 
social capital. One limiting factor in the study is the sample size. A larger 
sample would be needed to verify the findings presented here. 
The current study does not examine group social capital, which directly 
brings the benefits to the actors' affiliations instead of to the individual. 
Further research in this area may provide explanations of the moderating 
effect of actors' motivation on the relationship between social capital and 
corruption/bribery interaction and why there is no such moderating effect in 
the fmdings in this study. 
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CONCLUSION 
This study has explored relationships between the social capital of 
hierarchical relations and the benefits and risks these pose for Chinese finns. 
Therefore, identifying these elements can help a firm to balance the gains and 
losses of social capital within relationships of higher status and economic 
power, especially for firms operating within China's transition economy. 
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